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Conformity and State Income Taxes: Suggestions for the Crisis
by Michael A. Livingston and David Gamage
To guarantee adequate revenue in the post-
COVID-19 era, state governments should 
consider using all possible tools at their disposal. 
This article explains how and why state 
governments should evaluate their degree of 
conformity with federal tax changes in order to 
achieve this purpose. We recommend that state 
governments consider:
• Adopting either a static or selective 
conformity that enables the state to choose 
the federal tax changes it is adopting, rather 
than automatically adopting all changes. In 
most cases, in the current crisis conditions, 
this should primarily involve accepting 
revenue-enhancing provisions and 
rejecting those that reduce revenue.
• Rejecting or postponing conformity to 
several changes contained in the 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 
Security (CARES) Act, including changes to 
the business interest deduction rules 
(section 163), net operating losses (section 
172), charitable deductions (section 170), 
and several employer-related provisions, 
most of which are revenue losers.
• Adopting, if they have not done so already, 
the revenue-enhancing provisions of the 
global intangible low-taxed income rules, 
originally contained in the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017. (One of us has written on 
this topic in several prior essays — 
coauthored with Darien Shanske — so we 
will not repeat the details of this 
recommendation here.1)
The remainder of this article provides 
background and elaboration regarding the 
suggestions above. This essay is a contribution to 
Project SAFE: State Action in Fiscal 
Emergencies.2
General Background Discussion
Conformity3 relates to state governments’ 
practice of piggybacking on the federal income 
tax in designing state-level tax bases. All states 
with income taxes practice conformity to some 
degree, but the degree is important, especially in 
a period of rapid tax changes. When state 
revenues are in peril, as they are in every state in 
the COVID-19 era, these differences become 
especially significant.
One of the principal issues here is the 
question of static or dynamic conformity. 
Imagine that the federal government decides that 
beginning in 2018, previously depreciable 
expenditures are now currently expensed or 
depreciated on a faster schedule. A state 
practicing dynamic conformity would 
automatically enact the same change for its 2018 
returns. By contrast, a state practicing static 
conformity might say that it conformed to the 
federal system as of 2015, or even 2000, leaving 
for itself the choice of whether to enact the 
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1
E.g., Darien Shanske and David Gamage, “States Should Conform to 
GILTI, Part 3: Elevator Pitch and Q&A,” Tax Notes State, Oct. 14, 2019, p. 
121; and Shanske and Gamage, “Why States Can Tax the GILTI,” State 
Tax Notes, Mar. 18, 2019, p. 967.
2
See Gladriel Shobe et al., “Introducing Project SAFE (State Action in 
Fiscal Emergencies),” Tax Notes State, Apr. 27, 2020, p. 471.
3
For a more comprehensive treatment of the theory and practice of 
conformity, see Ruth Mason, “Delegating Up: State Conformity With the 
Federal Tax Base,” 62 Duke L.J. 1267 (2013). For more detailed treatment 
of conformity and the COVID-19 crisis, see Adam Thimmesch, “Taking 
Control of the State Tax Base During the Pandemic” (May 11, 2020).
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change above. In this example, the state’s 
revenue would be correspondingly higher.
Of course, when Congress expands the 
federal tax base, the effect is the opposite. Take, 
for example, the 2017 GILTI rules, which reduce 
tax evasion accomplished by transfer of 
intangibles to low-tax jurisdictions. A state 
practicing dynamic conformity would most 
likely put in place a similar rule regarding 2018 
returns. But a state that preferred static 
conformity would not: Unless it enacted new 
legislation, it would remain tied to old law, and 
continue to permit the (now federally 
impermissible) tax evasion. In this case, the static 
rule would reduce revenue.
A third possibility is for a state to practice 
selective conformity, adopting only those federal 
tax changes it wishes to and ignoring the others. 
This is implicit in the static method described 
above, but the state may also choose it explicitly.
Like many things in tax — or life — the 
playing field for state conformity is somewhat 
arbitrary in practice, reflecting historical 
circumstance more than a consistent logical 
pattern. For instance, according to a recent Tax 
Foundation report, 19 states have adopted static 
conformity regarding individual tax provisions, 
18 have adopted “rolling” (dynamic) conformity, 
and only four selective conformity, with a 
handful of states not fitting perfectly into any 
single category.4 Since the TCJA broadened the 
tax base, while reducing tax rates, the rolling or 
dynamic states (which in theory benefit from 
base broadening while still setting their own 
independent tax rates) would in this case come 
off better than those using a static model. But this 
conclusion relies on many assumptions, 
including the effect of the 2017 changes on 
personal exemptions and the standard 
deduction (which show up in taxable income but 
not adjusted gross income) and state conformity 
to changes in federal business tax provisions. 
States using selective conformity would have the 
best deal of all, assuming that they chose to 
embrace the revenue-enhancing provisions but 
not the revenue losers, although this is not 
always politically possible.
For states seeking new revenues — as many 
will be in the post-COVID-19 era — it would 
seem logical to adopt a selective approach (at 
least for the duration of the crisis), allowing them 
to follow changes that add revenue and avoid 
those with the opposite effect. There is 
admittedly a problem here in that it is hard to 
predict the nature and extent of federal tax 
changes. Like states, the federal government 
faces conflicting pressures, needing revenue 
enhancers to offset the losses resulting from 
COVID-19 but at the same time coming under 
enormous pressure to offer individual and 
corporate tax relief. A selective approach would 
allow a state to hedge its bets, metaphorically 
speaking, rather than adopt all federal changes 
(dynamic conformity) or presumptively reject 
them (static conformity).
An especially important element to all this is 
that state governments face very different policy 
constraints during economic downturns 
compared with the federal government. In 
particular, state governments face balanced 
budget constraints; they generally have to either 
raise tax revenues or enact painful spending cuts 
during economic downturns.5 By contrast, 
lacking such constraints, it is often good policy 
for the federal government to increase deficit 
spending during economic downturns and to 
give up tax revenue, thus taking less from 
private sector actors. Lacking this option, or 
facing much more stringent constraints on the 
option to borrow or deficit spend, state 
governments should generally prioritize raising 
revenues from economic actors with greater 
ability to pay (and to endure the economic 
downturn) over cutting spending programs 
needed either by those less able to endure the 
downturn or to minimize damage to state 
economies.6
Consider again a hypothetical federal 
government shift from depreciation to full 
expensing. A federal policy change of this sort 
might well be a prudent federal-level response to 
4
Jared Walczak, “Toward a State of Conformity: State Tax Codes a 
Year After Federal Tax Reform,” Tax Foundation: Fiscal Fact No. 631 
(Jan. 2019), at 7.
5
Gamage, “Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal 
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the economic downturn because it would reduce 
federal revenue while providing more funds and 
incentives for private sector businesses engaged 
in investment. But the downsides of such a 
policy change would be much higher if applied 
to state-level income taxes because the state 
governments cannot so easily deficit spend. This 
is thus a prime example of the sort of federal 
policy change that the state governments should 
probably not conform to during an economic 
downturn, despite this policy arguably being 
desirable regarding the federal tax laws.
Some Further Details
An immediate conformity problem presents 
itself in connection with the CARES Act, enacted 
this spring. The most visible example concerns 
the tax status of economic impact payments 
(EIPs) (“stimulus”) as well as loans provided 
under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) of 
the Small Business Administration, which help 
businesses meet payroll in the COVID-19 crisis. 
Federal law provides that EIPs are tax free and 
that the cancellation of loans made under the 
PPP is likewise exempt from tax. It seems 
unlikely any state would tax EIPs, except 
perhaps in extraordinary cases. But the PPP rules 
are a little bit more complex, providing that 
cancellation of the loans will not be taxable 
under section 61(a)(12) but lacking clarity about 
the extent to which related interest payments 
will be nondeductible under section 265, which 
prohibits deductions related to tax-exempt 
income.7 There may accordingly be room for 
states to take a more assertive position in this 
area.
The CARES Act also makes other temporary 
and permanent amendments to the federal tax 
laws, including changes to business interest 
deduction rules (section 163), NOLs (section 
172), charitable deductions (section 170), and 
several employer-related provisions, most of 
which are (understandably) of a pro-taxpayer, 
revenue-reducing variety. These provisions put 
states in a more difficult position, making them 
appear heartless to taxpayers if they do not 
conform to the new rules, but further reducing 
their early shrunken revenues if they don’t. 
States in need of more revenue should consider 
rejecting all these changes, particularly as they 
tend to affect primarily wealthier taxpayers and 
are likely to be largely invisible to the average 
voter. Refusing to adopt these changes would 
appear to involve fewer political risks than, say, 
a divergence from the PPP rules. 
7
See IRS Notice 2020-32, 2020-21 IRB 837 (Apr. 30, 2020).
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